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Abstract
This paper develops a method to compute the equilibrium correspondence for exchange
economies with semi-algebraic preferences. Given a class of semi-algebraic exchange economies
parameterized by individual endowments and possibly other exogenous variables such as prefer-
ence parameters or asset payoffs, there exists a semi-algebraic correspondence that maps param-
eters to positive numbers such that for generic parameters each competitive equilibrium can be
associated with an element of the correspondence and each endogenous variable (i.e. prices and
consumptions) is a rational function of that value of the correspondence and the parameters.
This correspondence can be characterized as zeros of a univariate polynomial equation that
satisfy additional polynomial inequalities. This polynomial as well as the rational functions that
determine equilibrium can be computed using versions of Buchberger’s algorithm which is part
of most computer algebra systems. The computation is exact whenever the input data (i.e.
preference parameters etc.) are rational. Therefore, the result provides theoretical foundations
for a systematic analysis of multiplicity in applied general equilibrium.
JEL classification numbers: C02, D51, D52, D58.
Keywords: Semi-algebraic preferences, equilibrium correspondence, polynomial equations, Gro¨bner
bases, equilibrium multiplicity.
∗We thank seminar participants at various universities and conferences and in particular Alex Citanna, Egbert
Dierker, George Mailath, Andreu Mas-Colell, Paolo Siconolfi and Harald Uhlig for helpful comments. We thank
Gerhard Pfister for help with SINGULAR and are indebted to Gerhard Pfister and Bernd Sturmfels for patiently
answering our questions on computational algebraic geometry. We are grateful to two anonymous referees for excellent
reports on earlier drafts.
1
1 Introduction
This paper examines the equilibrium correspondence of exchange economies with semi-algebraic
preferences. For a typical economy all equilibria are among the finitely many solutions of a square
system of polynomial equations. We apply methods from computational algebraic geometry to
obtain a univariate polynomial that describes a semi-algebraic correspondence from exogenous
parameters to the positive real line. Equilibrium allocations and prices are rational functions of
parameters and values of the correspondence. Since the semi-algebraic correspondence is described
by a univariate polynomial we call this equivalent characterization of the equilibrium correspondence
the univariate polynomial representation.
We repeat the summary of our main results more formally. Consider a class of semi-algebraic
exchange economies parameterized by elements in a set Ξ ⊂ Rm. Our univariate polynomial
representation then consists of a semi-algebraic correspondence ρ : Ξ⇒ R (described by a univariate
polynomial and polynomial inequalities) as well as rational functions mapping from Ξ × R to
the endogenous variables (allocations and prices). For generic parameters, ξ ∈ Ξ, prices and
consumption allocations are a competitive equilibrium if and only if there is an element y ∈ ρ(ξ)
such that the rational functions evaluated at the vector (ξ, y) ∈ Ξ × R yield exactly these prices
and allocations. Moreover, for fixed ξ the rational functions are polynomial in y.
Our proof of these results proceeds in two main steps. We first show that the assumption of
semi-algebraic preferences allows us to characterize all equilibria as those solutions to a square
polynomial system of equations that also satisfy a finite number of polynomial inequalities. In the
second main step we then apply the ‘Shape Lemma’ from computational algebraic geometry (see
Cox et al. (1997) or Sturmfels (2002)) to our system. The Shape Lemma states conditions under
which a square polynomial system of equations can be transformed to an equivalent system of
polynomial equations that has the same set of solutions but is of much simpler form. In particular,
the new simple system consists of one polynomial equation in one selected variable and then sets
each remaining variable equal to a polynomial expression of this selected variable.
The new representation of the original polynomials is a so-called Gro¨bner basis. We verify that
for our polynomial system of equilibrium equations the conditions for the Shape Lemma hold for
almost all parameter values. We therefore obtain the univariate polynomial representation of the
equilibrium system as part of a Gro¨bner basis of this system. We can compute Gro¨bner bases
in finitely many steps by Buchberger’s algorithm (see Cox et al. (1997)). This algorithm is a
cornerstone of computational algebraic geometry. In this paper we use a variation of this algorithm
as implemented in the computer algebra system SINGULAR (see Greuel et al. (2005)), which is
available free of charge at www.singular.uni-kl.de. We compute a variety of examples to illustrate
our results.
A nice aspect of the implementation of Buchberger’s algorithm is that all computations are exact
if all input parameters are rational numbers. We obtain the Gro¨bner basis for our system without
any rounding errors. This feature enables us to use the computed Gro¨bner bases in mathematical
proofs. We encounter rounding errors only when we compute the roots of the univariate polynomial
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in order to explicitly compute equilibrium values.
Although the main contribution of this paper is theoretical, we emphasize its practical rele-
vance. Applied general equilibrium models are ubiquitous in many areas of modern economics, in
particular in macroeconomics, public finance and international trade. The results of this paper can
be employed to explore uniqueness of equilibria in these models. The usefulness of the predictions
of general equilibrium models and the ability to perform sensitivity analysis are seriously challenged
in the presence of multiple equilibria. It is now well understood in general equilibrium analysis that
sufficient assumptions for the global uniqueness of competitive equilibria are too restrictive to be
applicable to models used in practice. However, it remains an open problem whether multiplicity of
equilibria is a problem that is likely to occur in realistically calibrated models. With the univariate
polynomial representation at hand the computation of all competitive equilibria reduces to finding
all roots of a univariate polynomial – numerically a very simple task. Moreover, examining this
univariate polynomial, we can sometimes find relatively tight bounds on the maximal number of
equilibria.
For simplicity we first present our results for a static finite Arrow-Debreu economy and limit
parameters to be individual endowments. We then show how the results extend to arbitrary pa-
rameters as long as these contain endowments of at least one agent. We can also easily apply
the developed tools to expanded versions of the model that are often of more interest to applied
researchers. To illustrate this point we apply our tools to exchange economies under uncertainty
with possibly incomplete asset markets (see e.g. Magill and Quinzii (1996)). In this model it is
notoriously difficult to approximate even one equilibrium with standard numerical techniques (see
e.g. Brown et al. (1996) and Kubler and Schmedders (2000)). Somewhat surprisingly, we can avoid
these problems for semi-algebraic economies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic semi-algebraic economy
and motivate the assumptions. Section 3 contains the main result and its proof. Section 4 illustrates
the main result with some examples. In Section 5 we show how to extend the analysis to models
with incomplete asset markets. Section 6 concludes.
2 Semi-algebraic Exchange Economies
Before we describe the economic model we first need to review some mathematical facts from
algebraic geometry. The first subsection defines polynomials and summarizes those properties of
semi-algebraic functions that are relevant for the model description. We refer the reader to the
excellent book by Bochnak et al. (1998) for an exhaustive treatment of real algebraic geometry. The
second subsection then defines semi-algebraic economies and discusses the economic implications of
our preference assumption (see Blume and Zame (1992) for an early application of this assumption).
3
2.1 Mathematical Preliminaries I:
Polynomial Rings and Semi-Algebraic Sets and Functions
For the description of a polynomial f in the n variables x1, x2, . . . , xn we first define monomials. A
monomial in x1, x2, . . . , xn is a product xα11 · xα22 · . . . · xαnn where all exponents αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
are non-negative integers. It will be convenient to write a monomial as xα ≡ xα11 ·xα22 · . . . ·xαnn with
α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ Zn+, the set of non-negative integer vectors of dimension n. A polynomial
is a linear combination of finitely many monomials with coefficients in a field K. We can write a
polynomial f as
f(x) =
∑
α∈S
aαx
α, aα ∈ K, S ⊂ Zn+ finite.
We denote the collection of all polynomials in the variables x1, x2, . . . , xn with coefficients in the
field K by K[x1, . . . , xn], or, when the dimension is clear from the context, by K[x]. The set
K[x] satisfies the properties of a commutative ring and is called a polynomial ring. Commonly
used examples of fields are the rational numbers Q, the real numbers R, and the field of complex
numbers C. A function h is called rational if there are polynomials f, g ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] such that
h = f/g where g is not the zero polynomial.
A polynomial f ∈ K[x] is irreducible over K if f is non-constant and is not the product of
two non-constant polynomials in K[x]. Every non-constant polynomial f ∈ K[x] can be written
uniquely (up to constant factors and permutations) as a product of irreducible polynomials over
K, see Cox et al. (1997). Once we collect the irreducible polynomials which only differ by constant
multiples of one another, we can write f in the form f = fa11 · fa22 · · · fass , where the polynomials
fi, i = 1, . . . , s, are distinct irreducible polynomials and the exponents satisfy ai ≥ 1, i = 1, . . . , s.
Being distinct means that for all i 6= j the polynomials fi and fj are not constant multiples of each
other. The polynomial f is called square-free if a1 = a2 = . . . = as = 1.
A subset A ⊂ Rn is a semi-algebraic subset of Rn if it can be written as the finite union and
intersection of sets of the form {x ∈ Rn : g(x) > 0} or {x ∈ Rn : f(x) = 0} where f and g are
polynomials in x with coefficients in R, that is, f, g ∈ R[x]. More valuable for our purposes than
this definition is the following lemma. It is a special case of Proposition 2.1.8 in Bochnak et al.
(1998) and provides a useful characterization of semi-algebraic sets.
Lemma 1 Every semi-algebraic subset of Rn can be written as the finite union of semi-algebraic sets
of the form
{x ∈ Rn : f1(x) = · · · = fl(x) = 0, g1(x) > 0, . . . , gm(x) > 0} , (1)
where f1, . . . , fl, g1, . . . , gm ∈ R[x].
Sets of the form (1) are called basic semi-algebraic sets.
A function (correspondence) φ : A→ Rm is semi-algebraic if its graph {(x, y) ∈ A× Rm : y =
φ(x)} is a semi-algebraic subset of Rn+m. Semi-algebraic functions have many nice properties. For
example, if φ : A→ Rm is a semi-algebraic mapping then the image φ(S) of a semi-algebraic subset
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S ⊂ A is also semi-algebraic. Similarly, the preimage φ−1(T ) of a semi-algebraic subset T ⊂ Rm is
also semi-algebraic. And A itself must be a semi-algebraic set.
A semi-algebraic set A can be decomposed into a finite union of disjoint semi-algebraic sets
(Ai)
p
i=1 where each Ai is (semi-algebraically) homeomorphic to an open hypercube (0, 1)
di for some
di ≥ 0, with (0, 1)0 being a point, see e.g. Bochnak et al. (1998, Theorem 2.3.6). This decomposition
property of semi-algebraic sets naturally motivates the definition of the dimension of such sets. The
dimension of the semi-algebraic set A is dim(A) = max{d1, . . . , dp}. For any two semi-algebraic
sets A and B it holds that dim(A×B) = dim(A) + dim(B).
We say a property holds generically in a semi-algebraic set A if it holds everywhere except in a
closed lower-dimensional subset of A. This notion of genericity is slightly different than the notion
based on transversality theory typically used in economic theory, see for example Mas-Colell (1985).
The definition of dimension allows us now to state another important property of semi-algebraic
functions. Let A ⊂ Rn and φ : A→ R be a semi-algebraic function. Then φ is real analytic, hence
infinitely often differentiable (smooth) outside a semi-algebraic subset of A of dimension less than
n.
2.2 Semi-algebraic Economies
We consider standard finite Arrow-Debreu exchange economies with H individuals, h ∈ H =
{1, 2, . . . ,H}, and L commodities, l = 1, 2, . . . , L. Consumption sets are RL+, prices are denoted
by p ∈ RL+. Each individual h is characterized by endowments, eh ∈ RL++, and a utility function,
uh : RL+ → R.
A competitive equilibrium consists of prices p and an allocation (c1, . . . , cH) such that
ch ∈ arg max
c∈RL+
uh(c) s.t. p · (c− eh) ≤ 0, for all h ∈ H,
and ∑
h∈H
(ch − eh) = 0.
We denote the profile of endowments across individuals by eH = (e1, . . . , eH) ∈ RHL++ and similarly
denote allocations by cH ∈ RHL+ and define λH = (λ1, . . . , λH). We assume that for each agent
h ∈ H, uh is C1 on RL++, strictly increasing and strictly concave. We also assume that for each agent
h the gradient ∂cuh(c)À 0 is a semi-algebraic function. We discuss this assumption in detail below.
As Blume and Zame (1992) point out, one can show generic local uniqueness of equilibrium prices in
semi-algebraic economies without the assumption of differentiability or strict concavity. However,
it is easy to see in an economy with Leontief utility that consumption allocations are not generically
locally unique without strict concavity. Since we work on the system of first order conditions and
market clearing equations involving both consumptions and prices we cannot dispense with strict
concavity.
We define an interior Walrasian equilibrium to be a strictly positive solution
(
cH, λH; p
)
of the
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following system of equations.
∂cu
h(ch)− λhp = 0, ∀h ∈ H (2)
p · (ch − eh) = 0, ∀h ∈ H (3)∑
h∈H
(chl − ehl ) = 0, l = 1, . . . , L− 1 (4)
L∑
l=1
pl − 1 = 0 (5)
Equations (2) and (3) are the first-order conditions for the agents’ utility maximization problem,
equations (4) are the market-clearing conditions for all but the last good, and equation (5) is a
standard price normalization.
An economy is called regular if at all Walrasian equilibria, ∂cuh(ch) is differentiable for all h
and if the Jacobian of this system of equations (2)–(5) has full rank.
From now on, we use the terms equilibria and interior equilibria exchangeably. We again
emphasize that we only focus on interior equilibria of a standard finite Arrow-Debreu exchange
economy for ease of exposition. The ideas and results of this paper apply to more general models,
see the examples in Section 5.
2.2.1 Economic Implications of Semi-algebraic Marginal Utility
How general is the premise of semi-algebraic marginal utility? From the practical point of view of
applied modeling, Cobb-Douglas and CES utility functions with elasticities of substitution being
rational numbers, are semi-algebraic utility functions. Therefore, a large number of interesting
applied economic models satisfy our assumption.
From a theoretical point of view, note that if a function is semi-algebraic, so are all its derivatives
(the converse is not true, as the example f(x) = log(x) shows). It follows from Blume and Zame
(1992) that semi-algebraic preferences (i.e. better sets are semi-algebraic sets) implies semi-algebraic
utility.
Also note that by Afriat’s theorem (Afriat (1967)) any finite number of observations on Mar-
shallian individual demand that can be rationalized by arbitrary non-satiated preferences can be
rationalized by a piecewise linear, hence semi-algebraic function. While Afriat’s construction does
not yield a semi-algebraic, C1, and strictly concave function, we can modify the construction in
Chiappori and Rochet (1987) for our framework to obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Given N observations (cn, pn) ∈ R2L++ with pi 6= pj for all i 6= j = 1, . . . , N , the following
are equivalent.
(1) There exists a strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuous utility function u such that
cn = arg max
c∈RL+
u(c) s.t. pn · c ≤ pn · cn.
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(2) There exists a strictly increasing, strictly concave, semi-algebraic and C1 utility function v such
that
cn = arg max
c∈RL+
v(c) s.t. pn · c ≤ pn · cn.
To prove the lemma, observe that if statement (1) holds, the observations must satisfy the condition
‘SSARP’ from Chiappori and Rochet (1987). Given this fact one can follow their proof closely to
show that there exists a C1 semi-algebraic utility function that rationalizes the data. The only
difference to their proof is that in the proof of their Lemma 2, one needs to use a polynomial ‘cap’-
function which is at least C1. In particular, the argument in Chiappori and Rochet goes through
if one replaces C∞ everywhere with C1 and uses the cap-function ρ(c) = max(0, 1 − ∑l c2l )2.
Since the integral of a polynomial function is polynomial, the resulting utility function is piecewise
polynomial, i.e. semi-algebraic.
Mas-Colell (1977) shows, in light of the theorems of Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu, that
for any compact (non-empty) set of positive prices P ⊂ ∆L−1 there exists an exchange economy
(without uncertainty) with (at least) L households, ((uh)Lh=1, (e
h)Lh=1), with u
h strictly increasing,
strictly concave and continuous such that the equilibrium prices of this economy coincide precisely
with P . Given Lemma 2 above, this result directly implies that for any finite set of prices P ⊂ ∆,
there exists an exchange economy ((uh)Lh=1, (e
h)Lh=1), with u
h strictly increasing, strictly concave,
semi-algebraic and C1 such that the set of equilibrium prices of this economy contains P . Therefore,
the abstract assumption of semi-algebraic preferences imposes no restrictions on multiplicity of
equilibria. Mas-Colell (1977) also shows that if the number of equilibria is odd, one can construct
a regular economy and that there exist open sets of individual endowments for which the number
of equilibria can be an arbitrary odd number.
Finally note that the results we obtain below are robust with respect to perturbations of prefer-
ences outside of the semi-algebraic class: If a semi-algebraic utility is C2, and a regular economy has
n equilibria, it follows from Smale (1974) that there is a C2 Whitney-open neighborhood around
the profile of utilities for which the number of equilibria is n.
In sum, our key assumption of semi-algebraic utility offers little if any room for objection. Much
applied work in economics assumes semi-algebraic utility. Utility functions derived from demand
observations are semi-algebraic.
2.2.2 Tarski-Seidenberg Principle
Semi-algebraic economies are theoretically appealing because of the Tarski-Seidenberg Principle
(see e.g. Brown and Kubler (2008) for applications of real algebraic methods in economics). The
principle, see e.g. Bochnak et al. (1998, Chapter 5), implies that it is ‘decidable’ whether a given
semi-algebraic economy has one or multiple equilibria. Algorithmic quantifier elimination (see
Basu et al. 2003) provides an algorithm to do so. In this subsection we explain how theoretically
algorithmic quantifier elimination can be used to compute the number of competitive equilibria
for any semi-algebraic economy. However, it is practically infeasible to implement this theoretical
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algorithm even for very small problems. This fact motivates us to reformulate the problem of
determining the number of equilibria to solving a system of polynomial equations and to consider
algorithms from computational algebraic geometry that find all solutions of polynomial systems of
equations.
The next lemma follows directly from the Tarski-Seidenberg Principle, see e.g. Bochnak et al.
(1998, Chapter 5).
Lemma 3 Given any semi-algebraic set X, with (x0, x1) ∈ X ⊂ Rl0 × Rl1 , define
Φ = {x0 | ∃ x1 [(x0, x1) ∈ X]}.
The set Φ is itself a semi-algebraic set and can therefore be written as the finite union of basic semi-
algebraic sets of the form (1) as in Lemma 1.
The lemma implies immediately that in our framework demand functions are semi-algebraic;
their graphs can be described by {(c, p) | ∃ λ [∂cu(c)− λp = 0 and p · (c− eh) = 0]}. Of course, in
this case it is trivial to eliminate the quantifier by simply eliminating λ.
More interestingly, the lemma also implies that for each n = 2, 3, . . . the set
Ei = {eH ∈ RHL++ : ∃
(
cHi , λ
H
i , pi
)
, i = 1, . . . , n, that solve (2)− (5)
and
(
cHi , λ
H
i , pi
) 6= (cHi′ , λHi′ , pi′) for all i, i′}
is a semi-algebraic set. If we knew the sets Ei we could easily determine the number of Walrasian
equilibria for the economy with endowments eH. While quantifier elimination provides an algorithm
for computing these sets, this approach is hopelessly inefficient. Surprisingly it turns out that, using
tools from computational algebraic geometry, we can be much more efficient. This insight provides
the basis of our strategy to finding all Walrasian equilibria. First we need to characterize equilibria
by a system of polynomial equations.
3 The Main Result
In this section we state and prove two versions of our main result. First, we consider the case where
the set of exogenous parameters consists of the profile of individual endowments. In Section 3.4
we extend the theorem to arbitrary parameters and state a corollary that links these results to the
motivation in the introduction.
To simplify the statement of the following theorem, let M = H(L+ 1) + L and associate with
x ∈ RM the vector (cH, λH, p).
Theorem 1 For generic profiles of individual endowments, eH ∈ RHL++, every competitive equilibrium
x∗ of the economy along with an accompanying positive number y∗ is among the finitely many common
zeros of the polynomials in a set G of the shape
G = {x1 − v1(eH; y), . . . , xM − vM (eH; y), r(eH; y)} . (6)
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The non-zero polynomial r ∈ R[eH; y] is not constant in y. Moreover, each vi, i = 1, . . . ,M, is a
polynomial in y of degree less than the degree of r. The coefficients of this polynomial are rational
functions of eH.
We refer to the set G as the univariate polynomial representation (UPR) of the equilibrium
correspondence. The set G consists of one univariate polynomial r in the single variable y and M
very simple polynomials in two unknowns. The polynomial xi − vi(eH; y) is linear in the variable
xi and consists otherwise only of the univariate polynomial vi in the variable y. An immediate
consequence of this special structure of the UPR is that once a positive solution y to the equation
r(eH; y) = 0 has been determined the accompanying values for all variables x1, x2, . . . , xM can be
read off the functions vi(eH; y), i = 1, . . . ,M .
Note that the conclusions of Theorem 1 do not hold for all endowment profiles eH ∈ RHL++
but only for generic endowments, that is, according to our convention, for all endowments in the
complement of a closed lower-dimensional subset E0 ⊂ RHL++.
In the remainder of this section we prove and extend Theorem 1. The proof proceeds in two
main steps. We first transform equations (2) – (5) into a square polynomial system of equations
and some additional polynomial inequalities. Subsequently we use results from computational
algebraic geometry to transform the derived square polynomial system into an equivalent univariate
polynomial representation G.
3.1 From Competitive Equilibrium to Polynomial Equations
For the transformation of equations (2) – (5) into a square polynomial system of equations and
some additional polynomial inequalities we need some results from algebraic geometry. We first
state these results and then apply them to our equilibrium equations.
3.1.1 Mathematical Preliminaries II:
Some Results from Real Algebraic Geometry
Lemma 4 Let A ⊂ Rn and φ : A → R be a semi-algebraic function. Then there exists a nonzero
polynomial f(x, y) in the variables x1, . . . , xn, y with f ∈ R[x, y] such that for every x ∈ A it holds
that f(x, φ(x)) = 0.
Proof. Lemma 1 states that the graph of the semi-algebraic function φ : A → R is the finite
union of basic semi-algebraic sets, each of which is of the form
{(x, y) ∈ Rn × R : f1(x, y) = · · · = fl(x, y) = 0, g1(x, y) > 0, . . . , gm(x, y) > 0} .
Note that in each basic semi-algebraic set at least one of the polynomials fi must be nonzero,
since otherwise the set would be open, which in turn would imply that the graph of φ contains a
nonempty open subset of Rn+1. But that would contradict the fact that φ is a function. Now con-
sider the product f of all nonzero polynomials fi across all basic semi-algebraic sets. This product
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is itself a nonzero polynomial and it satisfies f(x, φ(x)) = 0. ¤
The next lemma is a simple consequence of Hardt’s Triviality Theorem, see Bochnak et al.
(1998, Theorem 9.3.2) or Basu et al. (2003, Theorem 5.45). For applications of this theorem in
economics, see Blume and Zame (1992).
Lemma 5 Let A ⊂ Rn and φ : A→ Rk be a continuous semi-algebraic function. Then there is a finite
partition of Rk into semi-algebraic sets C1, . . . , Cm such that for each Ci and every b ∈ Ci
dim φ−1(b) = dim φ−1(Ci)− dim (Ci) ≤ dim (A)− dim (Ci),
where negative dimension means the set is empty. In fact, the partition can be chosen such that the
union of all Ci with dim (Ci) < k is a closed subset of Rk.
We also need a special case of the semi-algebraic version of Sard’s theorem (see e.g. Bochnak
et al. (1998), Theorem 9.6.2 for a general statement of the result).
Lemma 6 Let N ⊂ Rn be open and φ : N → Rn be a C∞ semi-algebraic function. Then the set of
y ∈ Rn for which there exists an x ∈ N with φ(x) = y and det(∂xφ(x)) = 0 is a semi-algebraic subset
of Rn of dimension strictly smaller than n.
As an application of the Tarski-Seidenberg Principle in combination with Hardt Triviality we
prove the following result which is used in our analysis below.
Lemma 7 Let E ⊂ Rl be an open semi-algebraic set. Suppose that a semi-algebraic function φ :
E × R2n → R2n with n ≥ 1 has finitely many zeros for each e ∈ E. Then for each µ outside a closed
lower-dimensional subset D0 ⊂ ∆n−1 there exists a closed lower-dimensional subset E0 ⊂ E such that
for all e ∈ E \ E0 there cannot be (x′, y′) 6= (x, y) ∈ Rn × Rn such that φ(e;x, y) = φ(e;x′, y′) = 0
and
n∑
i=1
µixi =
n∑
i=1
µix
′
i,
n∑
i=1
µiyi =
n∑
i=1
µiy
′
i.
Proof. Consider the set
A =
{
e ∈ E, µ ∈ ∆n−1 : ∃(x, y) 6= (x′, y′) φ(e;x, y) = φ(e;x′, y′) = 0 and
n∑
i=1
µixi =
n∑
i=1
µix
′
i,
n∑
i=1
µiyi =
n∑
i=1
µiy
′
i
}
.
Lemma 3 implies that the set A is semi-algebraic. Under the assumption that φ(e; ·, ·) has only
finitely many zeros it follows that dim(A) ≤ l + n − 2. Consider the projection of A onto ∆n−1,
g : A → ∆n−1 with g(e, µ) = µ. This is a continuous semi-algebraic function. Lemma 5 ensures
that ∆n−1 can be partitioned into a finite collection of semi-algebraic sets Cj , j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, such
that for each µ ∈ Cj , dim
(
g−1(µ)
) ≤ dim(A) − dim(Ci). Let D0 be the union of all Cj with
dim(Cj) < n− 1. Lemma 5 states that D0 is closed and that for any µ ∈ ∆n−1 \D0 it holds that
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dim
(
g−1(µ)
) ≤ dim(A)− dim(∆n−1 \D0) ≤ l + n− 2− (n− 1) = l − 1. Therefore, the dimension
of the corresponding set of parameters e must be less than l. Define the set E0 as its closure.
Proposition 2.8.2 in Bochnak et al. (1998) ensures that the closure has the same dimension less
than l. ¤
3.1.2 Polynomial Equilibrium Equations
The central objective of this paper is to characterize equilibria as solutions to a polynomial system
of equations. Recall that interior Walrasian equilibria of our model are defined as solutions to
the system of equations (2)–(5). Obviously equations (2) are often not polynomial – even under
our fundamental assumption that marginal utilities are semi-algebraic functions. This assumption,
however, allows us to transform these equations into polynomial expressions. Unfortunately this
transformation comes at the price of some technical difficulties.
The marginal utility ∂clu
h : RL++ → R is semi-algebraic. Lemma 4 then ensures the existence
of a nonzero polynomial mhl (c, y) with m
h
l ∈ R[c, y] such that for every c ∈ RL++,
mhl (c, ∂clu
h(c)) = 0. (7)
Without loss of generality we can assume the polynomial mhl to be square-free. In a slight abuse
of notation we define mh(c, ∂cuh(c)) = (mh1(c, ∂c1u
h(c)), . . . ,mhL(c, ∂cLu
h(c))). We use the implicit
representation (7) of marginal utility to transform each individual equation of system (2),
∂clu
h(ch)− λhpl = 0, (8)
into the polynomial equation
mhl (c
h, λhpl) = 0. (9)
By construction any solution to (8) also satisfies (9). Define the polynomial F ∈ R[cH, λH, p] by
F (cH, λH, p) =

mh(ch, λhp), h ∈ H
p · (ch − eh), h ∈ H∑
h∈H(c
h
l − ehl ), l = 1, . . . , L− 1∑
l pl − 1
Instead of focusing on the equilibrium system (2)–(5) our attention now turns to the system of equa-
tions F (cH, λH, p) = 0. This system has the original equations (2) replaced by polynomial equations
of the form (9) but otherwise continues to include the original equations (3)–(5). Therefore, this
system consists only of polynomial equations.
Note that the polynomials mhl (c, y) are derived from marginal utilities using the construction
in the proof of Lemma 4. Thus, for a solution of F (cH, λH, p) = 0 to be an equilibrium it must
also satisfy any inequalities that are suppressed in the construction process of the polynomials
mhl (c, y). Clearly checking many inequalities for an elaborately defined marginal utility will result
in additional combinatorial complexity of finding equilibria.
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For the proof of the main result we need to ensure that the Jacobian matrix ∂cH,λH,pF has
full rank at all Walrasian equilibria. We establish this fact in a generic sense. This property does
not follow directly from Debreu’s theorem on generic local uniqueness because we have replaced
the marginal utilities by the polynomials mh. To prove our result, we establish in Proposition 1
that for all consumption values c outside a lower-dimensional “bad” set ∂ymhl (c, ∂clu
h(c)) 6= 0 and
the implicit function theorem can be applied. Proposition 2 then establishes that for almost all
endowments all Walrasian equilibrium allocations lie outside the bad set. This property finally
allows us to prove Proposition 3 which states that for almost all endowment vectors all Walrasian
equilibria are regular solutions of the polynomial system F (cH, λH, p) = 0.
Proposition 1 Consider square-free nonzero polynomials mhl satisfying equation (7) for l = 1, . . . , L,
h ∈ H. Then the following statements hold.
(1) The dimension of the set V hl =
{
(c, y) ∈ RL++ × R : mhl (c, y) = 0
}
is L.
(2) The set
Shl = {(c, y) ∈ RL++ × R : mhl (c, y) = ∂c1mhl (c, y) = ∂c2mhl (c, y) = . . .
. . . = ∂cLm
h
l (c, y) = ∂ym
h
l (c, y) = 0}
is a closed semi-algebraic subset of RL++×R with dimension of at most L− 1. The projection of
Shl on RL++ is also a closed semi-algebraic subset with dimension of at most L− 1.
(3) The set
L⋃
l=1
{
c ∈ RL++ : ∂ymhl (c, ∂cluh(c)) = 0
}
is a closed semi-algebraic subset of RL++ with a dimension of at most L − 1. Put differently, at
every point of the complement of a closed lower-dimensional semi-algebraic subset of RL+ it holds
that ∂ym
h
l (c, ∂clu
h(c)) 6= 0 for all l = 1, . . . , L, and therefore uh is C∞.
(4) The set
Bh =
{
c ∈ RL++ : det
(
∂cm
h(c, ∂cuh(c))
)
= 0
}
is a closed semi-algebraic subset of RL++ with a dimension of at most L− 1.
Proof. Statement (1) follows by construction of mhl since the marginal utility function ∂clu
h is
defined for all c ∈ RL++. Thus, for all c ∈ RL++ there is a y ∈ R satisfying mhl (c, y). The dimension
of V hl cannot be L + 1 since m
h
l is a nonzero polynomial. Statement (2) follows from m
h
l being
square-free and the fact that the projection of a semi-algebraic set is itself semi-algebraic.
Marginal utility ∂cuh is a semi-algebraic function and thus C∞ at every point of the complement
of a closed semi-algebraic subset of RL++ of dimension less than L. The implicit function theorem
implies that at a point c¯ with ∂ymhl (c¯, ∂clu
h(c¯)) 6= 0 the function ∂cluh is C∞. The implicit function
theorem also implies that at a point c¯ with ∂ymhl (c¯, ∂clu
h(c¯)) = 0 the function ∂clu
h can be C∞
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only if ∂ckm
h
l (c, ∂clu
h(c)) = 0 for all k = 1, . . . , L. Statement (2) implies that this property can
hold only in a semi-algebraic set with dimension of at most L−1. The finite union of semi-algebraic
sets of dimension less than L is again just that, a semi-algebraic sets with dimension of at most
L− 1. Thus, Statement (3) holds.
Utility uh is strictly concave and so ∂cuh is strictly decreasing. Moreover, outside a closed lower-
dimensional set uh is differentiably strictly concave, that is, the Hessian ∂ccuh is negative definite.
Statement (3) and the implicit function theorem then imply rank [∂ccuh] = rank [∂cmh] = L and
thus Statement (4). ¤
We illustrate some of the possible complications in the proof of Proposition 1 in the context of
an example.
Example 1 Consider the continuous function
u′(c) =

4√
c
0 < c ≤ 1,
6− 2c 1 < c ≤ 2,
4
c 2 < c.
The polynomial m(c, y) = (16− cy2)(6− 2c− y)(4− cy) satisfies m(c, u′(c)) = 0 for all c > 0.
Unfortunately, for all values of c the equation m(c, y) = 0 allows positive solutions other than
y = u′(c). For example, for c = 4 not only y = u′(4) = 1 but also y = 2 yields m(4, y) = 0.
Intuitively, the solution (4, 2) is on the “wrong” branch of the function. At (4, 2) the term (16−cy2)
is zero but the domain for this term is only (0, 1]. For each value of c ∈ R++ there are altogether
four (real) solutions to the equation m(c, y) = 0.
The system m(c, y) = ∂cm(c, y) = ∂ym(c, y) = 0 has three solutions, (1, 4), (2, 2), and (4,−2).
For each value of c ∈ R++ the partial derivative term ∂ym(c, y) is a cubic polynomial in y with
at most three real solutions. So, the set B of ill-behaved points in the sense of Proposition 1,
Statement (4), is finite and thus of dimension L− 1 = 0.
This last fact would not be true if the polynomial m(c, y) were not square-free. The polyno-
mial m˜(c, y) = (16 − cy2)(6 − 2c − y)(4 − cy)2 has the identical zero set as m(c, y). But note
that ∂cm˜(c, y) = ∂ym˜(c, y) = 0 whenever (4 − cy) = 0. So, the fact that the polynomials mhl are
square-free is crucial for our results.
We collect the first two sets of polynomial expressions in F (cH, λH, p) in the ‘demand system’
and define for each h ∈ H,
Dh (c, λ, p) =
(
mh(c, λp)
p · (c− eh)
)
.
Proposition 2 For generic profiles of individual endowments, eH ∈ RHL++, all Walrasian equilibria
(cH, λH, p) have the property that for each h ∈ H, the rank of the matrix[
∂(c,λ)D
h
(
ch, λh, p
)]
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is (L+ 1) and thus is full.
To simplify the proof of the proposition we make use of individual demand functions. For this
purpose we introduce the following notation. The positive price simplex is ∆L−1++ = {p ∈ RL++ :∑
l pl = 1}. Individual demand of agent h at prices p and income τ is
dh(p, τ) = arg max
c∈RL+
uh(c) s.t. p · c = τ.
Individual demand functions are continuous. Lemma 3 ensures that the continuous function
dh : ∆L−1++ × R++ → RL is also semi-algebraic.
Proof. The individual demand dh(p, τ) of agent h is determined by the agent’s first-order condi-
tions,
∂cu
h(ch)− λhp = 0,
p · ch − τ = 0.
Since p ∈ ∆L−1++ these equations are equivalent to
∂cu
h(ch)∑
l ∂clu
h(ch)
= p,
∑
l
chl
∂clu
h(ch)∑
l′ ∂cl′u
h(ch)
= τ.
The function G : RL+ → ∆L−1++ × R++ given by the expressions on the left-hand side
G(ch) =

∂cuh(ch)∑
l ∂clu
h(ch)∑
l c
h
l
∂clu
h(ch)∑
l′ ∂cl′ u
h(ch)
is a continuous semi-algebraic function. Consider the set Bh from Statement (4) of Proposition 1.
This set has dimension of at most L− 1 and so the same must be true for the semi-algebraic set
G
(
Bh
)
=
{
(p, τ) ∈ ∆L−1++ × R++ : G(ch) = (p, τ) for some ch ∈ Bh
}
.
Next consider the following function from Blume and Zame (1992),
H(p, τ, e2, . . . , eH) =

d1(p, τ) +
∑H
h=2(d
h(p, p · eh)− eh)
e2
...
eH
(10)
for H : G(B1) × R(H−1)L++ → RHL++. Note that the domain of H is a semi-algebraic subset with
dimension at most HL − 1. Lemma 5 then ensures the existence of a finite partition of RHL++ into
14
semi-algebraic subsets C1, . . . , Cm such that for all subsets Ci of dimension HL and e ∈ Ci it holds
that H−1(e) is empty.
Thus, only for a closed lower-dimensional (that is, generic) subset of endowments it will be true
that c1 ∈ B1. This argument works for all agents h ∈ H. The finite union of semi-algebraic subsets
of dimension less than HL is again a semi-algebraic subset of dimension less than HL. Therefore,
for generic endowment vectors (e1, . . . , eH) all Walrasian equilibria have consumption allocations
such that ch /∈ Bh for all h ∈ H. For such consumption allocation the standard argument for
showing that
∂(c,λ)D
h
(
ch, λh, p
)
has full rank now goes through. ¤
The following proposition is a consequence of Proposition 2 and Lemma 6, the semi-algebraic
version of Sard’s Theorem.
Proposition 3 All Walrasian equilibria are solutions to the system of polynomial equations
F (cH, λH, p) = 0. (11)
For generic profiles of individual endowments, eH ∈ RHL++, all Walrasian equilibria have the property that
the rank of the matrix
[
∂cH,λH,pF (cH, λH, p)
]
is H(L+ 1) + L and thus is full.
Proof. Simply by construction all solutions to (2)–(5) are solutions to system (11).
Proposition 2 and its proof imply that there exists a subset of ∆L−1++ ×R++×R(H−1)L++ such that
the function H as defined by Equation (10) is C∞ on this set and the complement of its image in
RHL++ is closed and has dimension less than HL. By Lemma 6, the semi-algebraic version of Sard’s
Theorem, there is a semi-algebraic set E¯ ⊂ RHL++ whose complement is lower dimensional and closed
such that for each eH ∈ E¯, if p is a W.E. price then the matrix ∂p
( ∑
h∈H d
h(p, p · eh)
1−∑Ll=1 pl
)
has full
rank L. Since by the implicit function theorem and by Proposition 2, at these points for each h,
∂pd
h(p, p · eh) = −
(
∂c,λD
h(ch, λh, p)
)−1
∂pD
h(ch, λh, p),
the result follows from a standard argument showing that an equilibrium is regular in the extended
system (2) – (5) if and only if it is regular for the demand system
∑
h∈H(d
h(p, p · eh)− eh) = 0 and
1−∑l pl = 0. ¤
Note that Proposition 3 does not imply that for all eH ∈ E¯ the Jacobian of F has full rank at
all complex solutions. Equation (11) may have complex solutions at which the Jacobian is singular.
3.1.3 All-Solution Homotopy Methods for Polynomial Systems of Equations
We have seen that all Walrasian equilibria of our economic model are among the solutions of a
(square) system of polynomial equations. In our analysis below we apply Gro¨bner basis methods to
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examine such systems. Before we do so, it is worth noting that other methods for solving systems
of polynomial equations exist, most notably elimination methods using resultants, see Cox et al.
(1997) and Sturmfels (2002), and homotopy continuation methods, see Sommese and Wampler
(2005). Particularly homotopy continuation methods have been successfully applied to finding all
solutions of systems of polynomial equations. The currently leading software packages implementing
homotopy methods are PHCpack (Verschelde, 1999) and Bertini (Bates et al., 2008).
Gro¨bner basis methods and homotopy algorithms use distinctly different approaches to finding
all solutions and both types of methods have distinct advantages and disadvantages. Homotopy al-
gorithms are purely numerical solution methods which use floating point operations, while Gro¨bner
basis methods use exact computation with rational numbers. As a result homotopy methods usu-
ally are much faster and can solve much larger systems, while Gro¨bner basis methods can be used
to derive theoretical results. Homotopy methods cannot handle parameters, while Gro¨bner basis
methods can be used to analyze parameterized systems. In this paper we are interested in theoret-
ical results, particularly in characterizing the equilibrium manifold, and thus choose Gro¨bner basis
methods for the analysis of our problems.
3.2 Mathematical Preliminaries III: Gro¨bner Bases and the Shape Lemma
The study of systems of polynomial equations using Gro¨bner basis methods requires us to con-
siderably change the mathematical focus of our discussion. So far our analysis relied heavily on
fundamental results from the mathematical discipline of ‘Real Algebraic Geometry’, notably the
Tarski-Seidenberg Principle and the Hardt Triviality Theorem. We now move into the discipline of
‘(Computational) Algebraic Geometry’ and use Gro¨bner Bases to complete the proof of Theorem 1.
3.2.1 Polynomial Ideals and Varieties
Recall that the set of all polynomials in n variables with coefficients in some field K forms a ring
which we denote by K[x] = K[x1, . . . , xn]. A subset I of the polynomial ring K[x] is called an ideal
if it is closed under sums, f + g ∈ I for all f, g ∈ I, and it satisfies the property that h · f ∈ I for
all f ∈ I and h ∈ K[x]. For given polynomials f1, . . . , fk, the set
I = {
k∑
i=1
hifi : hi ∈ K[x]} = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉,
is an ideal. It is called the ideal generated by f1, . . . , fk. This ideal 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 is the set of all linear
combinations of the polynomials f1, . . . , fk, where the “coefficients” in each linear combination are
themselves polynomials in the polynomial ring K[x]. The Hilbert Basis Theorem, see Cox et al.
(1997), states that for any ideal I ⊂ K[x] there exist finitely many polynomials that generate I. A
set of such polynomials generating the ideal I is called a basis of I.
The radical of an ideal I is defined as
√
I = {f ∈ K[x] : ∃m ≥ 1 such that fm ∈ I}. The radical√
I is itself an ideal and contains I, I ⊂ √I. An ideal I is called radical if I = √I.
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The notion of ideals is fundamental to solving polynomial equations. While the coefficients in
our polynomial equations are real numbers much of the study of polynomial equations is done on
algebraically closed fields, that is, on fields where each non-constant univariate polynomial has a
zero. The field R of real numbers is not algebraically closed but the field C of complex numbers is.
The set of common complex zeros of the polynomials f1, f2, . . . , fk ∈ K[x],
V (f1, f2, . . . , fk) = {x ∈ Cn : f1(x) = . . . = fk(x) = 0}
is called the complex variety defined by f1, . . . , fk. For the remainder of this paper we only consider
complex varieties, but allow the coefficients of polynomials to be in an arbitrary field K. The variety
does not change if we replace the polynomials f1, . . . , fk by another basis g1, . . . , gl generating the
same ideal. That is, the notion of affine variety can be defined for ideals and not just for a set of
polynomials. For an ideal I = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 = 〈g1, . . . , gl〉 we can write
V (I) = V (f1, f2, . . . , fk) = V (g1, g2, . . . , gl).
Let us emphasize this point. The set of common zeros of a set of polynomials f1, f2, . . . , fk is identi-
cal to the common set of zeros of all (infinitely many!) polynomials in the ideal I = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fk〉.
In particular, any other basis of I has the same zero set. If the set V (I) is finite and thus zero-
dimensional, we call the ideal I itself zero-dimensional.
At this point of our discussion the reader may already have guessed a promising strategy for
analyzing and solving a system of polynomial equations. Considering that the set of solutions to a
system f1(x) = . . . = fk(x) = 0 is the same for any basis of the ideal I = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fk〉, we ask
whether we can find a basis that has “nice” properties and which makes describing the solution
set V (I) straightforward. Put differently, our question is: Can we transform the original system
f1(x) = . . . = fk(x) = 0 into a new system g1(x) = . . . = gl(x) = 0 that can be easily solved,
particularly if the solution set is zero-dimensional?
3.2.2 The Shape Lemma
‘Gro¨bner Bases’ are such bases that have desirable algorithmic properties for solving polynomial
systems of equations. Specifically, the ‘reduced Gro¨bner basis G in the lexicographic term order’
is ideally suited for solving systems of polynomial equations. A proper definition of the relevant
notions of Gro¨bner basis, reduced Gro¨bner basis, and lexicographic term order is rather tedious.
But the main mathematical result that is useful for our purposes is easily understood without many
additional mathematical definitions. Therefore we do not give all these definitions here and instead
refer the interested reader to the books by Cox et al. (1997) and Sturmfels (2002). The following
lemma, the so-called Shape Lemma, is central for our analysis and describes the properties of a
Gro¨bner basis that are important for Theorem 1. For a proof of the Shape Lemma see Becker et
al. (1994).
Lemma 8 (Shape Lemma)
Let I = 〈f1, . . . , fn〉 be a zero-dimensional radical ideal in K[x1, . . . , xn] with Q ⊂ K such that all d
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elements of V (I) have distinct values for the last coordinate xn. Then the reduced Gro¨bner basis of I
(in the lexicographic term order) has the shape
G = {x1 − v1(xn), . . . , xn−1 − vn−1(xn), r(xn)}
where r is a polynomial of degree d and the vi are polynomials of degree strictly less than d.
The Shape Lemma provides conditions under which the zero set V (f1, f2, . . . , fn) of a system of
polynomial equations f1(x) = f2(x) = . . . = fn(x) = 0 is also the solution set to another equivalent
system of polynomial equations having a very simple form. The equivalent system consists of one
univariate equation r(xn) = 0 in the last variable xn and n − 1 equations, each of which depends
only on a (different) single variable xi and the last variable xn. These equations are linear in their
respective xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
Some simple examples shed some light on the assumptions of the Shape Lemma. Consider the
system of equations x21 − x2 = 0, x2 − 4 = 0 and its solutions (2, 4) and (−2, 4). Both solutions
have the same value for the last coordinate x2. Clearly, no polynomial of the form x1 − v1(x2)
can yield the two possible values −2 and 2 for x1 when x2 = 4. The linearity in x1 prohibits this
from being possible. Next consider the system x21 − x2 + 1 = 0, x2 − 1 = 0 and its solution (0, 1).
Observe that for x2 = 1 the first equation yields x21 = 0 and so 0 is a multiple zero of this equation.
There cannot be a Gro¨bner basis linear in x1 that yields a multiple zero. For polynomial systems
with zero-dimensional solution sets, multiple zeros are ruled out by the Shape Lemma’s assumption
that I is a radical ideal. A multiple zero requires the ideal to contain a polynomial of the form fmi
with m ≥ 2 but not to contain fi. This cannot happen for a radical ideal. (Note that this simple
intuition is only correct for zero-dimensional ideals and does not generalize to higher dimensions.)
There is a large literature on the computation of a Gro¨bner basis for arbitrary sets of polynomi-
als. In particular, Buchberger’s algorithm always produces a Gro¨bner basis in finitely many steps.
We refer the interested reader to the book by Cox et al. (1997).
Before we can apply the Shape Lemma to our polynomial system of equations we need to
address two key issues. First, the lemma rests on the assumption that the ideal I = 〈f1, . . . , fn〉
is zero-dimensional and radical. For our economic equations we need a sufficient condition that
ensures this property. Secondly, for our economic model we do not only want to analyze a single
system of polynomial equations characterizing an economic equilibrium. Instead, we often think
of our economy being parameterized by a set of parameters and so would like to make statements
about the equilibrium manifold. Economic parameters lead to polynomial systems with coefficients
being polynomials in the parameters. These two issues motivate us to state a specialized version
of the Shape Lemma.
3.2.3 A Sufficient Condition for the Shape Lemma
In order to state a simple sufficient condition for the shape lemma, we need to restrict attention to
polynomials f ∈ K[x] with K ∈ {Q,R} and x ∈ Cn. Given a polynomial function g : Cn → C one
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can define partial derivatives with respect to complex numbers in the usual way. Write
g = c0(x−j) + c1(x−j)xj + . . .+ cd(x−j)xdj ,
where the ci are polynomials in the variables x−j = (x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xn). Then,
∂g
∂xj
:= c1(x−j) + . . .+ dcd(x−j)xd−1j .
Given a system of polynomial equations with fi : Cn → Cn, i = 1, . . . , n, the Jacobian ∂xf(x) is
defined as usual as the matrix of partial derivatives.
The next lemma states a sufficient condition for the ideal I = 〈f1, . . . , fn〉 to be zero-dimensional
and radical and follows from Cox et al. (1998, Chapter 4.2).
Lemma 9 Let f1, . . . , fn ∈ K[x] with K ∈ {Q,R} and x ∈ Cn. The ideal I = 〈f1, . . . , fn〉 is zero-
dimensional and radical if for all x ∈ V (I) it holds that det(∂x(f1(x), . . . , fn(x))) 6= 0.
3.2.4 Parameterized Shape Lemma
We can allow for parametric coefficients, ξ, for the polynomials f1, . . . , fn by choosing as the field
K(ξ). Buchberger’s algorithm then yields a set of polynomials v1, . . . , vn−1, r with coefficients that
are themselves rational functions of the parameters. For a generic ξ¯, this set of polynomials forms
a Gro¨bner basis for the ideal 〈f1, . . . , fn〉, where all fi are evaluated at this ξ¯.
This is only true for all values of the parameters outside the union of the solution sets to finitely
many polynomial equations because intuitively, Buchberger’s algorithm performs many divisions by
polynomials in the parameters and so for some parameter values a division by zero would occur. In
that case the Gro¨bner basis would be different since Buchberger’s algorithm performed an ill-defined
division.
We restate the Shape Lemma in parameterized form and let coefficients be from the field K = Q
or the field K = R.
Lemma 10 (Parameterized Shape Lemma)
Let Ξ ⊂ Rm be an open set of parameters and let f1, . . . , fn ∈ K[ξ1, . . . , ξm;x1, . . . , xn] with K ∈
{Q,R} and (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Cn. Suppose that for each ξ¯ = (ξ¯1, . . . , ξ¯m) ∈ Ξ the Jacobian matrix
Dxf(ξ¯;x) has full rank n whenever f(ξ¯;x) = 0 and all d solutions have a distinct last coordinate xn.
Then there exist r, v1, . . . , vn−1 ∈ K[ξ;xn] and w1, . . . , wn−1 ∈ K[ξ] such that for all ξ¯ outside a closed
lower-dimensional subset Ξ0 of Ξ,
{x ∈ Cn : f1(ξ¯;x) = . . . = fn(ξ¯;x) = 0}
= {x ∈ Cn : w1(ξ¯)x1 = v1(ξ¯;xn), . . . , wn−1(ξ¯)xn−1 = vn−1(ξ¯;xn); r(ξ¯;xn) = 0}.
The degree of r in xn is d, the degrees of v1, . . . , vn−1 in xn are at most d− 1.
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Note that Lemma 9 immediately implies that for fixed ξ¯, there exist some polynomial functions
in x, v˜1, . . . , v˜n−1, r˜ ∈ K[x] such that the Shape Lemma representations holds,
{x ∈ Cn : f1(ξ¯;x) = . . . = fn(ξ¯;x) = 0}
= {x ∈ Cn : x1 = v˜1(xn), . . . , xn−1 = v˜n−1(xn); r˜(xn) = 0}.
The fact that the coefficients of these polynomials are rational functions of ξ follows from the
observations that the set of rational functions, K(ξ), forms a field and that each ideal has a unique
(reduced) Gro¨bner basis (see Cox et al. (1997)). For given generic ξ¯, the unique (reduced) Gro¨bner
basis of the ideal 〈f1(ξ;x), . . . , fn(ξ;x)〉 ⊂ K(ξ)[x1, . . . , xn], which has the form of Lemma 10, must
specialize to the unique (reduced) Gro¨bner basis of the ideal 〈f1(ξ¯;x), . . . , fn(ξ¯;x)〉 ⊂ K[x1, . . . , xn].
3.3 Proof of Theorem 1 and Discussion
We are now in the position to complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. We view equations (11) as a system of equations in complex space. Recall that to simplify
the notation we let M = H(L + 1) + L and associate with x ∈ CM the vector (cH, λH, p). In our
economic models we cannot prohibit multiple equilibria to have identical values for one or several
variables and so in general we cannot assume that the assumption of the Shape Lemma on the
distinct values of the last variable xM is satisfied. To circumvent this problem we introduce a new
last variable y and a linear equation y =
∑
i µixi with random coefficients µi relating all existing
variables to the new variable. And so we are now concerned with the system of M + 1 polynomial
equations
F (eH;x) = 0, (12)
y −
M∑
i=1
µixi = 0, (13)
with parameters µ = (µ1, . . . , µM ) ∈ ∆M−1 and the variables x ∈ CM and y ∈ C.
Proposition 3 implies that for generic eH equations (12) together with the condition
1− t det[∂F (eH;x)] = 0 (14)
generate a zero-dimensional radical ideal in K[eH;x, t]. The system (12),(14) consists of M + 1
equations in the M + 1 complex variables x1, . . . , xn, t. We can identify a complex number z ∈ C
with the vector (Re(z), Im(z)) ∈ R2 consisting of its real part Re(z) and its imaginary part Im(z).
Then we can view the left-hand sides of these equations as a system of semi-algebraic functions
g : R2M+2 → R2M+2. For generic eH this function has finitely many zeros. Lemma 7 implies
that for a generic element µ ∈ ∆M−1 the set of eH for which there are two distinct solutions
x 6= x′ ∈ R2M with g(Re(x), Im(x)) = g(Re(x′), Im(x′)) = 0 and ∑Mi=1 µi(Re(x)i − Re(x′)i) =∑M
i=1 µi(Im(x)i − Im(x′)i) = 0 is lower-dimensional and closed. Therefore, the polynomials in
the equations (12), (13), and (14) form a zero-dimensional radical ideal in K[eH;x, t, y]. Thus, for
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generic endowments eH, we can apply Lemma 10, the parameterized Shape Lemma, to the entire
system (12) – (14). The set of solutions to this system is identical to the solution set of a system
with the shape G (omitting the variable t and the accompanying polynomial). Finally, by construc-
tion all Walrasian equilibria of the economy satisfy equations (12) and (13). Proposition 3 implies
that for generic endowments all Walrasian equilibria also satisfy equation (14). ¤
Observe from this proof that the UPR is not unique. Different choices of the random weights
µi in Equation (13) lead to different UPRs. Also, the generic set of endowments for which the
theorem holds depends on µ. For large (parameterized) classes of economies there exists a UPR
for which the rational function determining the L’th price is simply pL = y, i.e. µ is taken to
be µ = (0, . . . , 0, 1). Clearly such a UPR is preferred since it enables us to avoid the additional
variable y. Such a UPR exists if for each economy in the class all solutions to the polynomial
equilibrium system, F (cH, λH, p) = 0, have distinct values for the L’th price. As Paolo Siconolfi
(private communication, 2007) pointed out to us, all competitive equilibria have distinct L’th price
for an open and dense set of (semi-algebraic) preferences. We do not attempt to derive this result
here in terms of generic sets of preference parameters. In our examples below we can always use
the last price as the last variable and omit the new variable for generic values of the preference
parameters.
From a practical perspective it is important to note that for the same equilibrium correspondence
some UPRs, using the SINGULAR implementation of Buchberger’s algorithm, are substantially
easier to compute than others. The choice of linear form or last variable does matter for running
times.
In the non-generic case, when the Shape Lemma fails to hold, Buchberger’s algorithm still
produces a Gro¨bner basis. Thus an examination of the SINGULAR output always allows us to
diagnose whether the input system yields a basis in shape form. Furthermore, under weaker con-
ditions than those required for the Shape Lemma, the Gro¨bner basis will be in a triangular form
that still facilitates a simple computation of all complex solutions.
3.4 Arbitrary Parameters
As we mentioned in the introduction, modelers are often interested in characterizing the map from
exogenous parameters to competitive equilibria where the parameters are not restricted to consist
of profiles of individual endowments but instead may contain preference parameters, tax rates,
or other economically interesting exogenous parameters. In the following we explain how we can
generalize Theorem 1 to such situations.
There are two occasions in the proof of Theorem 1 where we restrict the set of parameters,
agents’ individual endowments, to a generic subset of the entire set of parameters. We need to
invoke this restriction both for the application of Lemma 10, the parameterized Shape Lemma, and
for the application of Proposition 3 which states an important full rank condition for Walrasian
equilibria. It is worthwhile to emphasize the fundamental difference between these two restrictions
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on the parameter set.
Proposition 3 states a semi-algebraic version of the well-known restriction on endowments that
ensures that all equilibria satisfy the standard regularity condition. Some economies do not satisfy
this condition and thus need to be excluded. So this condition on agents’ individual endowments
rests on the underlying economic model. On the contrary, the condition in the parameterized Shape
Lemma, which reads rather similar, does not hinge directly on the economic model. Instead it is a
consequence of the application of Buchberger’s algorithm for the computation of the Gro¨bner basis
in shape form. This result holds for arbitrary parameters.
For an illustration of the described distinction let us consider Arrow-Debreu exchange economies
that are parameterized by both profiles of endowments as well as preference parameters. We assume
that for each agent h, utility uh is parameterized by some ζ ∈ RK++ and we assume that ∂cluh(ζ; c)
is semi-algebraic in both ζ and c. Lemma 3 immediately implies that there exist polynomials
mhl (ζ; c, y) such that for every c ∈ RL+,
mhl (ζ; c, ∂clu
h(ζ; c)) = 0.
We now consider an arbitrary (possibly lower dimensional) set of parameters Ξ ⊂ RHL++ × RHK++
that contains both some individuals’ endowments and some preference parameters. To indicate the
dependence on these parameters, we rewrite the polynomial equilibrium system from above as
F (ξ; cH, λH, p) =

mh(ζh; ch, λhp), h ∈ H
p · (ch − eh), h ∈ H∑
h∈H(c
h
l − ehl ), l = 1, . . . , L− 1∑
l pl − 1
In this formulation, it should be clear that some of the ehl and some of the ζ
h are constant while
others can be part of the vector ξ. We can now state a different version of Theorem 1 which perhaps
is more appealing to applied general equilibrium modelers.
Theorem 2 Suppose that for generic parameters ξ ∈ Ξ, every Walrasian equilibrium satisfies
det
[
DcH,λH,pF (ξ; c
H, λH, p)
] 6= 0.
Then for generic ξ ∈ Ξ, every Walrasian equilibrium x∗ of the economy along with an accompanying
positive number y∗ is among the finitely many common zeros of the polynomials in a set G of the shape
G = {x1 − v1(ξ; y), . . . , xM − vM (ξ; y), r(ξ; y)} . (15)
The non-zero polynomial r ∈ R[ξ; y] is not constant in y. Moreover, each vi, i = 1, . . . ,M, is a
polynomial in y of degree less than the degree of r. The coefficients of this polynomial are rational
terms in ξ.
The proof of this theorem closely follows the proof of Theorem 1, except that we assume generic
regularity instead of proving it. Therefore, we do not need equation (14) and do not invoke the
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regularity result of Proposition 3 but can entirely rely on the parameterized Shape Lemma and on
Lemma 7. This lemma continues to hold since it only relies on finitely many solutions which again
is guaranteed by the assumption of regularity.
The new theorem raises the question, of course, if there are other sets of parameters which
ensure generic regularity. Observe that the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 carry over to other
parameter sets as long as these include the individual endowments of at least one agent. Let
ξ = (e1, ξ\e1) consist of the parameters of interest and define dh(ξ; p, τ) to be agent h’s individual
demand function as a (semi-algebraic) function of the parameters, prices and income (of course dh
will only depend on some of the elements of ξ or might not depend on ξ at all).
We redefine the function H from equation (10) in the proof of Proposition 2 as follows,
H(p, τ, ξ\e1) =
{
d1(ξ; p, τ) +
∑H
h=2(d
h(ξ; p · eh)− eh)
ξ\e1
Since Walras’ law implies that if H(p, τ, ξ\e1) = ξ then τ = p · e1, the vector p is a competi-
tive equilibrium price for the economy with parameters ξ if and only if there is a τ such that
H(p, τ, ξ\e1) = ξ.
In the following corollary we summarize our discussion on more general parameter sets in the
spirit of the discussion in the introduction.
Corollary 1 Suppose Ξ is a semi-algebraic set that contains individual endowments of at least
one agent. Then there exists a semi-algebraic correspondence ρ : Ξ → R+ and rational functions
vi : Ξ×R++ → R, i = 1, . . . ,M , such that for a generic vector of parameters ξ ∈ Ξ the vector x∗ is a
competitive equilibrium if and only if there is a y ∈ ρ(ξ) such that x∗i = vi(ξ; y).
The corollary follows from Theorem 2 in conjunction with the observation that endowments of
one individual suffice to guarantee generic regularity and the fact that the set
{(ξ, y) : r(ξ; y) = 0 & vi(ξ; y) > 0, i = 1, . . . ,M & (v1(ξ; y), . . . , vM (ξ; y)) solve (2)− (5)}
is a semi-algebraic set and the graph of the correspondence ρ.
3.5 Practical Implications: Equilibrium Multiplicity
Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollary 1 describe the structure of the equilibrium correspondence for semi-
algebraic economies. As such this result is theoretical in nature. But the rather simple description
of the equilibrium correspondence has significant practical implications, too. Here we emphasize
the perhaps most obvious one, namely the analysis of equilibrium multiplicity.
Theorem 1 reduces the problem of solving the system of equilibrium equations essentially to
solving a single univariate polynomial equation. This equivalence enables us to employ bounds on
the number of zeros of univariate polynomials to derive bounds on the number of solutions to the
equilibrium system; that is, we can obtain bounds on the number of equilibria. In some applications
this property enables us to prove uniqueness of equilibrium.
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The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra, see e.g. Sturmfels (2002), states that a univariate poly-
nomial, f(x) =
∑d
i=0 aix
i, with rational, real or complex coefficients ai, i = 0, 1, . . . , d, has d zeros,
counting multiple roots, in the field C of complex numbers. That is, the degree d of the polynomial
f is an upper bound on the number of complex zeros. More importantly for our economic analysis
even better bounds are available for the number or real zeros. For a finite sequence a0, . . . , ak of real
numbers the number of sign changes is the number of products aiai+l < 0, where ai 6= 0 and ai+l
is the next non-zero element of the sequence. Zero elements are ignored in the calculation of the
number of sign changes. The classical Descartes’s Rule of Signs, see Sturmfels (2002), states that
the number of positive real zeros of f does not exceed the number of sign changes in the sequence
of the coefficients of f . This bound is remarkable because it bounds the number of (positive) real
zeros. It is possible that a polynomial system is of very high degree and has many solutions but
the Descartes bound on the number of positive real zeros of the representing polynomial r in the
Shape Lemma proves that the system has a single real positive solution.
The Descartes bound is not tight and overstates the true number of positive real solutions for
many polynomials. Sturm’s Theorem, see Sturmfels (2002) or Bochnak et al. (1998), yields an
exact bound on the number of positive real solutions of a univariate polynomial. For a univariate
polynomial f , the Sturm sequence of f(x) is a sequence of polynomials f0, . . . , fk defined as follows,
f0 = f, f1 = f ′, fi = fi−1qi − fi−2 for 2 ≤ i ≤ k
where fi is the negative of the remainder on division of fi−2 by fi−1, so qi is a polynomial and the
degree of fi is less than the degree of fi−1. The sequence stops with the last nonzero remainder fk.
Sturm’s Theorem provides an exact root count, see e.g. Bochnak et al. (1998) for a proof.
Lemma 11 (Sturm’s Theorem)
Let f be a polynomial with Sturm sequence f0, . . . , fk and let a < b ∈ R with neither a nor b a root
of f . Then the number of roots of f in the interval [a, b] is equal to the number of sign changes of
f0(a), . . . , fk(a) minus the number of sign changes of f0(b), . . . , fk(b).
Buchberger’s algorithm computes Gro¨bner bases exactly for the case of rational coefficients,
that is, the set of polynomials G can be computed exactly whenever marginal utility can be written
as a polynomial with rational coefficients. Once the UPR for an economy (or a class of economies
parameterized by endowments or preference parameters) is known, we can use the univariate poly-
nomial to determine the number of real zeros of the system and the number of competitive equilibria.
For fixed values of all parameters, Sturm’s algorithm provides an exact method to determine the
number of solutions to a univariate polynomial in the interval [0,∞). Therefore, we can deter-
mine the exact number of solutions of the univariate polynomial. Using simple bracketing, we
can then approximate all solutions numerically, up to arbitrary precision. Given the solutions to
the univariate representation, the other solutions can then be computed by evaluating polynomials
up to arbitrary precision. This is the only point in the procedure where the computation is not
exact. Even this last computational step could be performed exactly by resorting to methods from
computational algebraic number theory, see Cohen (1996). While the theory for the representation
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of algebraic numbers in the reals is sound we suspect that any implementation of these methods
would be too slow to be of interest.
4 Applications
In this section we apply our tools to some parameterized economies. A simple class of semi-algebraic
utility can be obtained by assuming that utility is separable, i.e. uh(c) =
∑L
l=1 uhl(cl) with each
u′hl being a semi-algebraic function. We first consider the case of quadratic utility because the
resulting equations are simple and provide a nice illustration of our tools. We then move to the
case of utility exhibiting constant elasticity of substitution (CES). This latter case is prevalent in
economic applications.
4.1 Quadratic Utility
There are two agents and two commodities, utility functions for agent h and good l are
uhl(c) = ahlc− 12bhlc
2.
For the case where utility is symmetric across goods, i.e. uh1 = uh2, there always exists a unique
Walrasian equilibrium. The following polynomial system of equations is solved by any interior
Walrasian equilibrium. (We write bh for bh1 = bh2 and normalize utility so that ahl = 1 for h = 1, 2
and l = 1, 2. To avoid confusion between exponents and the traditional agent superscript h we
write chl instead of chl , ehl instead of e
h
l , and λh instead of λ
h.)
1− b1c11 − λ1p1 = 0
1− b1c12 − λ1p2 = 0
1− b2c21 − λ2p1 = 0
1− b2c22 − λ2p2 = 0
p1(c11 − e11) + p2(c12 − e12) = 0
p1(c21 − e21) + p2(c22 − e22) = 0
c11 + c21 − e11 − e21 = 0
p1 + p2 − 1 = 0
Note that as discussed we can parameterize the economies not just by agents’ endowments but in
addition by other parameters, here the utility parameters b1 and b2.
Observe that for a specific value of p2 the last equation fixes the value of p1. The remaining
equations are then linear in the remaining variables. Therefore, the system cannot have two solu-
tions with the same value for p2. Thus, if we use p2 as the last variable then our results holds for
this system without an additional linear form. Implementing this system in SINGULAR yields an
equivalent system with the shape G. The last equation in the variable p2 is of the form
r(eH, b1, b2; p2) = C2p22 + C1p2
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with the coefficients
C2 = b1b2e11 + b1b2e12 + b1b2e21 + b1b2e22 − 2b1 − 2b2,
C1 = −b1b2e12 − b1b2e22 + b1 + b2.
We observe that the univariate equation in G depends on all six parameters of the model. Obviously,
the equation r(·; p2) = 0 has two solutions. One solution is p2 = 0, which is not a Walrasian
equilibrium. It is easy to check that for economically meaningful values of the parameters bh and
endowments eH it holds that C2 < 0 and C1 > 0 and so p∗2 = −C1/C2 ∈ (0, 1) is a Walrasian
equilibrium price. The remaining equations (which we do not report here) then yield all remaining
variable values. The UPR now asserts that the interior Walrasian equilibrium (if there is one) is
unique.
Next we allow utility to differ across agents and goods. For this general case the univariate
polynomial r has the form
r(eH, (ahl, bhl)h=1,2,l=1,2; p2) = C4p42 + C3p
3
2 + C2p
2
2 + C1p2,
where C1, C2, C3 and C4 are polynomials in the parameters. All four polynomials contain positive
and negative monomials in the parameters and so their respective signs depend on the actual
parameter values.
Again p2 = 0 is a solution to this equation which does not correspond to a Walrasian equilibrium.
Thus, there can be at most 3 Walrasian equilibria. For many parameter values only exactly one
of the solutions to r = 0 corresponds to a Walrasian equilibrium. However, it is easy to “reverse-
engineer” parameter values to obtain an economy with 3 equilibria. For example, suppose e1 =
(10, 0), e2 = (0, 10) and
u′11(c) = 9− c, u′12(c) = 29/4− 7/8c, u′21(c) = 116− 26c, u′22(c) = 24− 4c.
It is easy to verify that this economy has at 3 equilibria with prices (p1, p2) being (4/5, 1/5),
(3/5, 2/5) and (1/2, 1/2), respectively. In fact, the representing polynomial from the Gro¨bner basis
for the equilibrium system is r(p2) = 50p42−55p32+19p22−2p2. By Descartes’ bound this system has
at most three positive solutions. For them to be equilibrium prices they must lie in (0, 1). We can
apply Sturm’s theorem and use SINGULAR to compute the number of sign changes of the Sturm
sequence at 0 and the number of sign changes of the Sturm sequence at 1. It turns out that there
are exactly 3 solutions in (0, 1).
4.2 CES Utility
We consider economies with H = 2 agents and L ≥ 2 commodities. Suppose agents have CES
utility functions with marginal utility of the form
u′hl(c) = (αhl cl)
−σ. (16)
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For simplicity we assume that elasticities of substitution are identical across agents and that σ is an
integer. After transforming agents’ first-order conditions into polynomial expressions we obtain the
specific form of Equations (11) for our CES-framework (using the same notation as in the previous
example).
ασhlc
σ
hlλhpl − 1 = 0, h ∈ H, l = 1, . . . , L,
L∑
l=1
pl(chl − ehl) = 0, h = 1, . . . , H,
H∑
h=1
chl − ehl = 0, l = 1, . . . , L− 1,
L∑
l=1
pl − 1 = 0.
We can greatly reduce running times of SINGULAR if we write the equilibrium equations slightly
differently. In particular, we normalize p1 = 1 and eliminate all Lagrange multipliers. Defining
ql = p
1/σ
l , l = 2, . . . , L, we obtain a system of equations that is equivalent as far as the economic
model is concerned.
αh1c
h
1 − αhlchlql = 0, h ∈ H, l = 2, . . . , L, (17)
ch1 − eh1 +
L∑
l=2
qσl (chl − ehl) = 0, h = 1, . . . , H, (18)
H∑
h=1
chl − ehl = 0, l = 1, . . . , L− 1. (19)
Any positive real solution of this system is in fact a Walrasian equilibrium. For almost all parameters
all equilibria have a distinct last price pL.
The resulting UPR is now as follows.
r(eH, αH; y) =
∑σ
i=0 v
r
i (eH, αH) y
i
chl =
∑σ−1
i=0 v
chl
i (eH, αH) y
i, h ∈ H, l = 1, . . . , L
ql = v
ql
1 (eH, αH) y + v
ql
2 (eH, αH), l = 2, . . . , L− 1
qL = y,
where the vr are polynomials, the vc and vq are rational functions. (The only exponent is i.) Note
that all equilibria are uniquely described by r(eH, αH, y) = 0 and y > 0. Note also that prices
are linear in y, independent of the number of goods and of σ. Allocations are polynomials in y of
degree σ − 1. We can use this representation to bound the maximal number of equilibria and for
given endowments and preference parameters compute the exact number of equilibria by solving a
single univariate polynomial.
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Descartes’ bound implies that there can be at most σ real zeros to the polynomial system, and
so, independently of L, we can bound the number of equilibria by the elasticity of substitution
σ. But since for σ → ∞ the number of equilibria remains finite, this bound cannot be tight for
sufficiently large σ.
For the case of only L = 2 commodities the expressions simplify. Without loss of generality
normalize αh2 = 1−αh1 for both agents h = 1, 2. To simplify the notation further denote q2 simply
by q and αh1 by αh. The resulting polynomial r in the UPR is then
r(eH, αH; y) = (α1e22 + α2e12 − α1α2(e12 + e22)) yσ − α1α2(e11 + e21) yσ−1 +
(1− α1)(1− α2)(e12 + e22) y + (α1α2(e11 + e21)− α1e11 − α2e21)
The univariate polynomial r has exactly four terms for σ ≥ 3. Since 0 < α1, α2 < 1 the polynomial
has always exactly three sign changes. Descartes’s Rule of Signs implies that there can be at most
3 real positive solutions.
The bound of three equilibria is tight, as the following simple case illustrates. Suppose σ = 3,
α1 = 1/5, α2 = 4/5 and e12 = e21 = 1. If e11 = e22 = f > 44 the economy has three equilibria –
with these parameters the univariate representation above becomes
r(y) = (f + 16)y3 − (4f + 4)y2 + (4f + 4)y − f − 16
whose 3 positive real roots for f > 44 correspond to 3 Walrasian equilibria.
The rather small upper bound on the number of equilibria is no longer valid once we consider
economies with more than two agents. While we detect still a lot of structure in the equations, we are
unable to derive general bounds on the number of equilibria. One drawback of using SINGULAR for
our computations is that with the current state of technology we can only solve models of moderate
size, say of about 20 – 25 polynomial equations of small or moderate degree. While our paper builds
the theoretical foundation for computing all equilibria in general equilibrium models, we currently
cannot solve applied models that often have hundreds or thousands of equations. We expect that the
development of ever faster computers and more efficient or perhaps even parallelizable algorithms
will allow for the computation of Gro¨bner bases for larger and larger systems. For recent advances
see, for example, Fauge`re (1999).
5 Incomplete Financial Markets
In this paper we have shown how we can use tools from algebraic geometry to analyze the equilib-
rium correspondence of static finite Arrow-Debreu economies if equilibria are described by polyno-
mial equations and inequalities. In order to convince the reader that the described tools are not
restricted to such economies but instead are applicable to many other economic models we now
briefly demonstrate an application of these tools to models with incomplete financial markets. Such
models are well known to be much more complicated than the standard Arrow Debreu model. We
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first present a short description of an incomplete markets model (see Magill and Quinzii (1996) for
a general discussion) and then discuss results for some examples.
5.1 Models with Incomplete Financial Markets
We consider an exchange economy under uncertainty. As before there are H individuals, h ∈ H =
{1, 2, . . . ,H}, and L physical commodities, l = 1, 2, . . . , L. Uncertainty is modeled through a set
of S + 1 states of nature, s ∈ S = {0, 1, . . . , S}. Commodities cannot be transferred across states.
Consumption sets are RL(S+1)+ and prices are denoted by p ∈ RL(S+1)+ . We write psl for the price
of commodity l in state s and define ps = (ps1, . . . , psL). Each individual h is characterized by
endowments, eh ∈ RL(S+1)+ , and a utility function, uh : RL(S+1)+ → R. As before we assume that
for each agent h ∈ H, uh is C1 on RL(S+1)++ , strictly increasing and strictly concave and that the
gradient ∂cuh(c)À 0 is a semi-algebraic function.
To transfer wealth across states of nature agents must trade financial securities. There are J
securities. Asset j can be traded at state s = 0 at a price qj and its payoff in each state s = 1, . . . , S
is assumed to be a polynomial function of prices in that state, Ajs ∈ R[ps]. Agents portfolios are
denoted by θ ∈ RJ .
A competitive equilibrium consists of prices p, q, allocations cH and portfolios θH such that for
each agent h ∈ H,
(ch, θh) ∈ argmax
(c,θ)∈RL(S+1)+ ×RJ
uh(c) s.t. p0 · (c0 − eh0) + q · θ ≤ 0
ps · (cs − ehs ) ≤
∑
j θjA
j
s(ps), for s = 1, . . . , S,
and ∑
h∈H
(ch − eh) = 0.
Using the ‘Cass-Trick’ (see Cass (2006) for an overview of equilibrium theory with incomplete
markets), we take agent 1 to be ‘unconstrained’ and define an interior Walrasian equilibrium to be
a solution
(
cH, (θh, λh)h=2,...,H , µ, p, q
)
, with p, q, cH positive, to the following system of equations.
∂cu
1(c1)− µp = 0 (20)
p · (c1 − e1) = 0 (21)
∂csu
h(ch)− λhsps = 0, ∀h = 2, . . . ,H, s ∈ S (22)
−qλh0 +
S∑
s=1
λhsAs(ps) = 0, ∀h = 2, . . . ,H, s ∈ S (23)
p0 · (c0 − eh0) + q · θ = 0, ∀h = 2, . . . ,H (24)
ps · (chs − ehs )− θh ·As(p) = 0, ∀h = 2, . . . ,H, s = 1, . . . , S (25)∑
h∈H
(chsl − ehsl) = 0, ∀s ∈ S, l = 1, . . . , L, (s, l) 6= (S,L) (26)
∑
s∈S
L∑
l=1
psl − 1 = 0 (27)
29
As before, we can rewrite marginal utility in terms of polynomials and replace the non-polynomial
Equations (20) and (22) by m1(c1, µp) = 0 and mhs (c
h
s , λsps) = 0, respectively. In order for Theo-
rem 1 to carry over to this setting, we need to show that for almost all endowments, this polynomial
system of equations is regular, that is, we have to show analogues of Propositions 1 – 3 above.
We define for h > 1,
dh(p; eh) = argmaxc∈RLS+ u
h(c) s.t. p0 · (c0 − eh0) + q · θ ≤ 0
ps · (cs − ehs ) ≤
∑
j θjA
j
s(p), for s = 1, . . . , S,
We assume that the payoff matrix A(p) =
(
A1(p), . . . , AJ(p)
)
has rank J for generic p ∈ ∆SL+
and assume that for each agent h the function dh is continuous for prices in this generic set. The
unconstrained agent’s demand,d1(p, τ) is defined as above d1(p, τ) = argmaxc∈RSL+ u
1(c) s.t. p · c ≤
τ .
There are now two crucial insights: First, the unconstrained agent can be chosen arbitrarily
among the set of agents, this ensures that there cannot be robust equilibria for which individual
consumption lies in the ‘bad set’ Bh and the proof of Proposition 1 goes through as before. The
other insight is that the set of prices for which A(p) has full rank J is a semi-algebraic set (see also
Anderson and Raimondo (2007) for a thorough analysis of this set). Therefore, we can perform
our analysis on this set and Propositions 2 and 3 carry through. It remains to be shown that this
restriction to prices does not robustly wipe out equilibria for which A(p) has rank less than J . But
this again follows from Hardt triviality; given any economy with some of the original assets taken
out, generically there will be no equilibrium for which prices lie in the lower-dimensional set for
which A(p) has rank less than J .
Note that this does not imply that equilibrium necessarily exists. But when it exists, it can be
described by Theorem 1.
5.2 Example
We consider the simplest possible example to illustrate how the possibility of non-existence of
equilibrium is irrelevant for our method. We assume that there is no uncertainty in the second
period, i.e. suppose that S = 1 so that there are two time periods with one state in the second
period, s = 0, 1. There are two agents and two goods in the second period, for simplicity there is
only one good in the first period. Agents’ utility functions are
uh(c) = uh0(c01) + u
h
1(c11, c12) where u
h
0(c) = c− 1/200c2, uh1(c1, c2) = uh0(c1) + uh0(c2).
There is a single asset paying ps2 − ps1 in the second period at s = 1. Clearly, equilibrium does
not need to exist since for p12 = p11 the rank of the payoff matrix drops from one to zero. Suppose
agent 2 has constant endowments of one, e201 = e
2
11 = e
2
12 = 1 while agent 1’s endowments are
e101 = 2, e
1
1 = (e, 1) with 99 > e > 0 being a parameter (we only consider e < 99 to rule out that
one agent could be satiated in equilibrium). Note that for e = 1 we must have p12 = p11 in any
competitive equilibrium.
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For this simple case of identical utility across commodities, the univariate polynomial r in
the UPR is linear in y and all variables are directly rational functions of the parameter. So the
UPR directly computes the equilibrium of the parameterized economy. All coefficients are rational
numbers and the solution is exact. We normalize p01 = p11 = 1. The competitive equilibrium
prices and portfolios are given by
q =
1− e
197
, p12 =
198
199− e, θ
1 =
−19503e2 + 3920103e− 11623788
e3 − 399e2 + 40394e− 39996 .
At e = 1 the price of the asset becomes zero and the denominator in the expression of θ1 is zero.
The portfolio holding is not defined. At this point the rank of the payoff matrix drops to zero.
Equilibrium nevertheless exists, there is no trade. At the non-generic point e = 1, the UPR does
not give the correct solution to the system, since Lemma 10 only holds for generic parameters. For
all other (real) values of e the denominator of the asset position never vanishes. For 1 6= e < 99 an
equilibrium always exist with the payoff matrix having full rank 1.
We modify the example so that in the second period agent 2 does not have identical utility
across the two goods. Suppose
u21(c1, c2) = c1 − 1/200c21 + c2 − 1/160c22.
We make no other modifications to the economy. The analysis is now more complicated. The
equilibrium prices in state 1 depend on the wealth distribution across the two agents.
r(y, e) = 3058149y3 + (46572e− 6197797)y2 + (335e2 − 100175e+ 3233873)y
+(e3 − 359e2 + 18625e− 24176)
q = y
p12 =
197y + e− 199
e− 199
θ1 =
−27125783404e2 + 5434208802433e− 7199403102164
9e5 − 7175e4 + 1623387e3 − 77212929e2 + 243727714e− 191476296y
2 +
−137849568e3 − 27849610063e2 + 5427223492904e− 7197195219345
9e5 − 7175e4 + 1623387e3 − 77212929e2 + 243727714e− 191476296 y +
176315e4 − 88351742e3 + 37963058360e2 − 117616735896e+ 97640477377
9e5 − 7175e4 + 1623387e3 − 77212929e2 + 243727714e− 191476296
The expression for θ1 is not well-defined if the denominator becomes zero, i.e. if
9e5 − 7175e4 + 1623387e3 − 77212929e2 + 243727714e− 191476296 = 0.
This polynomial has three real zeros which are (approximately) 1.332, 2 and 59.6. As e → 1.332,
p12 → p11, but at p11 = p12, the asset pays zero in both states. In the equilibrium without the asset
spot prices in state 1 are no longer equal, therefore no equilibrium can exist for this endowment
value. For e = 59.6 this situation is similar and there is no equilibrium either. For e = 2 the
situation is different, just like in the first example, equilibrium does exist (and there is no trade
in the asset), but for this non-generic value of e the UPR does not represent the competitive
equilibrium. For all other values of e < 99 equilibrium does exist and is described by our UPR.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a method to characterize and to compute the equilibrium correspondence
for exchange economies with semi-algebraic preferences. We first have shown how equilibria in these
economies can be characterized as particular solutions to square polynomial systems of equations.
Subsequently we have applied powerful methods from computational algebraic geometry to obtain
an equivalent system of equations that has a very simple structure, the univariate polynomial rep-
resentation. The computer algebra system SINGULAR enables us to compute the UPR explicitly.
In particular, if all coefficients in the polynomial equilibrium system are parameters and rational
numbers then the computation is exact, that is, without rounding errors.
We have presented the development of the new methods in the context of Arrow-Debreu ex-
change economies. But clearly the results apply to many different models. To illustrate this gener-
ality we have shown an application to a model with incomplete financial markets, the well-known
GEI model. For brevity we have not presented further applications in this paper. We just mention
that we have also successfully applied our tools to general equilibrium models with production,
the Lucas asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and complete markets, OLG models, and
strategic market games.
The nature of the analysis in this paper is rather technical. We emphasize once again, however,
that the results have important implications for applied general equilibrium modeling. In this
paper we have illustrated how the UPR can be used for an analysis of equilibrium multiplicity.
Using the UPR we can determine an upper bound on the number of equilibria and approximate
all equilibria numerically. Thus this paper has laid the theoretical foundation for the analysis of
equilibrium multiplicity in general equilibrium models. Another potentially interesting application
of our results is the reverse-engineering of economies from “observables.” Modelers can use the
UPR to determine whole sets of model parameters so that the resulting equilibrium values match
observed values of endogenous variables.
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